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1DEBT, DROUGHT, DEATH and DEFERRAL
A modest interim proposal and after for Southern Africa 
By Reginald Herbold Green
Should be starve our children 
To pay our debts?
- Mwalimu Julius Nyerere
Introduction
It is a decade and a half since then President Nyerere posed his - he hoped 
rhetorical - question but it haunts us yet. In practice debt service has 
constricted programmes for children and safety net support more generally. 
Some governments have been very explicit - paying debts to external 
creditors did have higher priority for them than a balanced budget or 
primary health and education let alone safety nets and land reform. The 
question not only can be but is answered "yes" and not only by creditors.
In Southern Africa, today afflicted by the most horrendous drought in a 
century with over 50% grain crop losses not uncommon, rivers as large as 
the Zambesia at one-third normal flows and ones as major as the Limpopo 
reduced to cracked mud flats for hundreds of miles, the question must be 
faced urgently and literally. Seeking to keep up existing full or, more 
usually partial service on external debt can and will kill both through 
limits on imports and constraints on budget allocations to cover calamity 
offset programmes.
Yes, in the cases of some debts (but not those of the IMF or the World 
Bank) non-servicing (or greater non-servicing) will in fact be condoned - 
but that is rarely clear before the event. Yes, not all of Southern 
Africa's ten states (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique,
Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) are in desperate 
external account difficulties but there is a general problem and the need
2for a general framework of guide-lines within which to assess the 
individual country cases.
Above all there is a need for speed. Life - more accurately death by 
starvation - will not wait while detailed, long term external debt 
reduction settlements are negotiated. Interim measures - focused on 
deferral to free fiscal and forex cash flow - are needed now followed by a 
genuinely long term oriented follow-up to end the game of repetitive 
reschedulings when everyone is well aware the bulk of the debt will not and 
cannot be serviced. The moral hazard is not 'encouraging' default by those 
who could pay. Rather it lies in creating conditions resulting in the 
death of those who could live - a proposition with which Adam Smith with 
his emphasis on the underlying "moral economy" would have concurred 
heartily.
Drought is an unpredictable - even if predictably recurring - and natural - 
even if human aggravatable or reducible - phenomena. Famine is made by 
man's inadvertence or lack of concern and death by famine in the context of 
large external debt service payments is morally and conceptually equivalent 
to negligent homicide.
Background to Debacle
The ten SADCC (Southern African Development Coordination Conference) states 
have a total external debt of the order of $32,500 million excluding 
($40,000 million including) IMF drawings, trade payment arrears and 
currently revolving trade credits. Their GDP (domestic production of goods 
and services) is of the order of $25,000 million and their exports 
(including services and worker remittances) about $8,000 million. Debt 
service if fully paid (which in several cases it is not) would come to
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$5,250 to $5,500 million or up to 70% of total external account earnings.
One need only set out the parameters to note their non-viability.
Fungibility (current aid freeing export earnings to service debt) and de 
facto condoned arrears (every now and again formally written forward - or 
off) are essential to keeping several economies afloat.
There is a spectrum. Botswana's external reserves exceed its external debt 
(and for that matter are equivalent to 18 months imports) and its net 
external interest bill is significantly negative. Mozambique is, in fact, 
servicing nothing much beyond IMF drawings and World Bank (IDA) credits but
3even that eats up 30% (the normal severely indebted cutoff point) of 
recorded exports plus remittances. The others are intermediate but it is 
worth noting that only three - Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe - have been 
totally able to avoid going into at least temporary arrears on both debt 
and trade payments while Zambia and Tanzania are uncomfortably close to the 
Mozambican situation.
The overall external balance positions range from satisfactory but with a 
high vulnerability factor (Botswana) and potentially (with true peace) 
satisfactory (Angola) through just viable (Namibia and - until 1991 - 
Zimbabwe) and on past very serious (Malawi) and disastrously weak 
(Tanzania, Mozambique and Zambia).
Therefore it is fair to conclude that:
a. a general regional problem does exist;
b. with need for varying degree of debt burden reduction in nine cases; so 
that
c. a guide-line framework within which to negotiate case by case 
resolutions could be of significant value.
The Apocalypse Drought
Progress toward a set of viable debt stabilisation and redeployment (i.e. 
cutback and reduction) agreements in Southern Africa since 1985 has been 
piecemeal, short term, uneven and inadequate. This alone would have doomed 
every attempted Structural Adjustment Programme in Zambia prior to 1992. 
Arguably acceptance of what amounts to rolling default in Tanzania and 
Mozambique and a gradual broadening of scope of debt postponement/erosion 
explorations might have led to more adequate and durable solutions 
(dissolutions of crippling debt burdens) by 1995. The 1991/1993 drought 
(1991 rain failure until 1993, hopefully normal, main harvest) has made 
rapid progress much more urgent.
A sober senior UNDP official who earlier had been sceptical of drought 
disaster early warnings looked sadly across his desk in March 1992 and said 
"This i£ the Apocalypse drought". That is a sober fact recorded in 
hundreds of factual micro area reports, a dozen official and unofficial 
country studies and at least three major regional studies (one independent,
4one SADCC, one FAO/WFP with UNICEF assistance). The grain output for South 
and Southern Africa is little more than 40% of normal - 1992/93 net imports 
will need to be 11 million tonnes vs normal 1985/91 net exports of the 
order of 5 million tonnes. There is no parallel case recorded since the 
1890s drought/rinderpest disasters. It is symbolic that in Gaza Province 
of Mozambique, where the doomsday proverb is "When the great river runs dry 
the end of the world is at hand", the mighty Limpopo River has simply 
vanished for over 200 miles - an event not previously known in 
contemporaneously recorded history.
The Southern African 10 require at least 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 million 
tonnes of grain imports plus 500,000 tonnes of legumes, beans, sugar and 
vegetable oil to avert already grievously high average levels of 
malnutrition (famine borderline in most of rural Mozambique and Angola and 
parts of southern Malawi even in 'normal' years). Of that, commercially 
financeable totals can hardly exceed 1,500,000 tonnes leaving a true food 
aid requirement of at least 5 million tonnes grain equivalent. In fact, 5 
million tonnes ($1,000 million landed cost) is above the $850 million of 
the UN appeal, much less of the probable pledges and least of all of 
plausible actual deliveries (the only "trigger clauses" in food aid 
commitments in the case of non-fulfilment point at the non-recipients not 
the non-deliverers). While some 1992/93 food aid had in fact been pledged 
earlier the additional transport distribution, camp and water supply costs 
of the drought far exceed the saving.
A rough estimate of food and other emergency import costs not coverable 
from previous aid pledges or reasonably available national import capacity 
is $1,100-1,250 million plus at least $250 million in local costs or 
$1,350-1,500 million. Even were the appeal met in full the forex deficit 
would be of the order of $300 million and the fiscal (allowing for some *
claw-back on food aid commercialised in towns) about the same.
Drought does not limit its impact to food. It hits agricultural export 
production too. Therefore it creates a scissors effect - more food imports 
needed and less agricultural export generated export proceeds available.
And with the loss of grower marketed crops (food or other) comes loss of 
rural entitlements to buy from the urban sector and therefore of the 
ability to use installed urban production capacity. Lower tariffable 
imports, lower sales taxed manufacturing output and lower urban and
5agricultural profits taxes similarly slash state revenues at the same time 
that drought relief costs pile more burdens on the budget.
As with debt, drought is uneven. The two northernmost SADCC states - 
Angola and Tanzania - have been drought afflicted only in part. Indeed 
Angola's north central and northern flood damage may be worse than its 
southeastern drought losses while Tanzania may achieve 80% of normal grain 
harvests. However, as a result of war (and of UNITA's land mining to 
prevent food production strategy) Angola has a large structural food 
deficit. While Tanzania does not have a structural deficit - except in 
wheat - neither does it have food, cash or credit margins to ride out a 15% 
loss of grain output especially as drought has damaged export production 
(especially of cotton) and 1992/93 prices for cotton and coffee are 
disastrously low.
The combination of drought and terms of trade declines can be anticipated 
to have a very serious impact on several economies. Mozambique - as a 
result of externally generated war - has less than no safety margin. In 
Tanzania, one of the longer running and more successful Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (1984-92 including the two years before international 
funding was secured) is at risk as is Malawi's rather older one. The 
Zimbabwe programme went badly off track in its first year reversing GDP 
gains, ending near balance on the current account and exploding into an 
expectations fuelled currency depressing/inflation raising spiral. Adding 
the drought pressures (including large commercial imports) could cause its 
early demise. Zambia's proto programme could only too easily follow its 
predecessors and be born mortally ill. Angola may well have a large peace 
dividend to come, but needs to be able to spend it on livelihood 
rehabilitation not debt service, while Namibia plagued by disastrous 
mineral markets might well be unable to continue to juggle fiscal prudence, 
a degree of external account balance and moderate human investment 
advances. The situations of Lesotho and Swaziland also gives ground for 
concern especially if the drought impact on South Africa leads to a demand 
(and remittance) collapse for scores of thousands of nominally alegal or 
illegal seasonal, other agricultural and small town migrant workers as 
appears probable.
Deferral Now
Food aid may plug most of the import requirements gap albeit for Zimbabwe, 
Swaziland and Lesotho there will need to be substantial additions to 
commercial imports (as well as for Botswana which can afford them). On the 
past record it is most unlikely to cover full distribution costs or the 
bills related to displacement into camps or peri-urban margins. Certainly 
it cannot offset export earning losses. Quick disbursing, untied balance 
of payments support which nominally could take so long to negotiate it can 
hardly be expected to do much to mitigate mid-1992 to mid-1993 import 
capacity compression (or in the worst cases strangulation). Additional IMF 
drawings (beyond those already programmed pre-drought) are unlikely to be 
available and because most of the countries are using higher credit tranche 
or equally high conditionality SAF/ESAF facilities, the IMF is literally 
unable to fulfil its basic purpose of providing short term bridging finance 
fast to give time to sort out more permanent financing or rebalancing 
measures.
Therefore, the least unlikely route to reducing import capacity - fiscal 
and production compression may be reduction of debt service actually paid. 
It is unrealistic to expect this to be achieved by overall long term 
agreements on total write-downs and reschedulings completed during the next 
few months. It is hardly desirable that it should be achieved by non­
agreed increases in accrual of arrears. For Tanzania, Zambia and 
Mozambique that would, in effect, mean arrears to the Fund and Bank since 
even before the drought they were unable to pay much to anyone else. For 
Angola it would threaten its reviving ability to secure new quasi­
commercial project finance. For Malawi it would be the first default on 
rescheduled debt and for others - notably Zimbabwe and Namibia the first 
breach in basically arrears free records they have paid a high price to 
sustain in the hope of continuing to secure 90-180 day trade credit (direct 
or via financial institutions now) now and a rising volume of medium term 
loans plus investments in the foreseeable future.
... a. Modest Proposal
Therefore, a more modest proposal - Deferral Now - deserves attention. If 
it is to be achieved in time six principles need to be agreed:
7a. the period of deferral is 1 July 1992 - 30 June 1993 (partly 
retrospective);
b. all external government and defaulted government guaranteed debts are
to be covered including those already rescheduled;
c. creditor governments will in cases in which it would appear prudent, 
and Southern African governments request it, use their moral suasion to 
secure analogous deferral by commercial lenders in respect to medium 
and long term items;
d. special arrangements in respect to service due to the IMF, World Bank
and African Development Bank will be explored in cases in which these
exceed 33% of the debt service actually paid over 1989/90 and 1990/91;
e. the deferral will be reviewed in March/May 1993 and if 1992/93 crops 
are also seriously low (as seems likely if the 1980/84 and 1985/89 five 
year bad and good harvest cycles are being followed by a 1990/94 phase 
of poor to disastrous harvests) will be renewed for 1993/94;
f. a general framework as to eligibility for deferral will be agreed
between major debtors and the Southern African 10 but case by case 
application and formal agreements will then be negotiated within that 
framework.
The principles for reassessing need could include:
a. severity of external imbalance based on new food import requirements
(less those covered by grant aid) and projected (lowered) export 
levels;
b. present levels of debt service actually paid;
c. fiscal stringency resulting from revenue losses flowing from drought
plus emergency programmes necessary to mitigate its impact.
On this basis, while the need would vary widely absolutely and relative
both to present debt service payments and to imports, only Botswana would
be likely to fail to qualify for substantial deferral.
Official loan/defaulted guaranteed credit service deferral would be central 
for Malawi, Swaziland, Lesotho and Angola. The simplest form of deferral
8would be full rolling forward of 1992/93 payments to 1993/4 - 1997/8 
(preferably with waiver of 1992/93 interest). The same is true of Namibia 
if one treats the paper issued by the Administrator General under what was, 
at international (and Namibian) law, a period of illegal occupation and 
fully guaranteed by the South African Treasury as official. It would be 
significant for Zimbabwe (albeit there commercial debt service is a heavier 
burden) and, perhaps, Zambia but not for Tanzania and Mozambique because 
they have a de facto, unagreed, unstable moratorium on the bulk of such "
debt.
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Commercial debt service deferral - say back to back transactions amounting 
to rolling forward at least all capital repayments - are crucial for 
Zimbabwe. So long as interest was paid (or net paid in part with full 
gross payment but partial redrawing) in what is demonstrably an emergency, 
the effect on post-drought credit ratings should be fairly low.
The conceptual problem cases are perhaps Malawi, probably Zambia and 
certainly Mozambique and Tanzania. The last two will need to have relief 
from at least a portion of IMF, World Bank and APB debt service as, in all 
probability, will the first two. Whatever the merits or demerits of 
Fund/Bank rescheduling or write-off no agreement can possible be reached in 
the time available. Deferral on other debt service in the context of a 
demonstrable catastrophe of quite abnormal magnitude raises no real issue 
of precedent; formal Fund/Bank arrears or reschedulings would. However, a 
series of ad hoc arrangements would appear less contentious:
a. allowing higher SAF/ESAF limits above levels now programmed to enable 
redrawing back to back with repayments of, and interest in respect of, 
older drawings;
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b. current or partly retrospective conversion of old World Bank loans to 
Southern African states now in the "mixed" and "IDA" eligible 
categories to IDA status;
c. where "b" yields little or no result because already at least partly 
done (Tanzania) or there are no non-IDA outstandings (Mozambique) 
secure additional bilateral finance to cover a portion of IDA service.
Each of these approaches has one or more precedents so no inherent problem 
of principle need prevent rapid agreement.
9The rapid negotiation of a framework between major creditors and the region 
should be practicable. All are SADCC member States and have experience 
working/negotiating jointly. Further, SADCC is actively involved already 
in several other aspects of coordinating actions to mitigate human, social 
and economic impact of the drought. Further in fact, it did much of the 
homework for a Region/Creditor conference two years ago before deciding 
that the time was not then propitious for such an initiative.
Deferral is exactly what it says - rolling forward (albeit with some 
marginal alleviation elements suggested above) not resolving. However, it 
would in the context of the drought buy time to negotiate a more detailed 
and sustainable settlement (which would have been needed drought or no 
drought). Also it would create a useful precedent or game plan, both for 
Southern Africa in 1993/94 if there is a continued drought cycle and more 
-generally for quick response to major exogenous calamities hitting severely 
indebted countries or sub-regions. In the present Southern African context 
buying time (realistically at a low cost to debtors and creditors alike) 
through deferral is ransoming lives.
And After
Clearly the end result of the drought will be a reduced ability - other 
things held equal - to service external debt. Equally clearly the effect 
of the deferral by itself would be to increase post drought debt service 
burden. In any case, as already noted, for a majority of the countries the 
pre drought debt service burden was too high to be consistent on reasonable 
projections with achieving sustainably high rates of output and of 
investment growth consistent with a manageable degree of overall external 
account balance.
Therefore, agreement on deferral should be followed by a long term oriented 
set of negotiations to reduce debt service on existing plus reasonably 
projected future obligations to levels consistent with prudent economic 
growth and development objectives (e.g. these set out in the World Bank's 
Long Term Perspective Study). Again a two stage approach would be 
desirable:
a. Creditor/SADCC 10 Guide-lines Agreement; providing a frame for
b. Case by case country/creditor agreements.
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The Guide-lines Agreement would presumably spell out:
a. broad criteria for estimation of debt servicing capacity and the amount 
to be allowed for servicing future loans (especially for countries like 
Zimbabwe and Angola which have realistic medium term prospects of 
securing such credit on a significant scale;
b. types of debt relief instruments/approaches to be used in respect to 
official, commercial and - where necessary - international financial 
institution outstandings the service on which exceeds the ceilings 
estimated from the earlier Guide-lines.
Again it appears that the only non-qualifier would be Botswana. With its 
external reserves in excess of external debt and the healthiest economy in 
the region (indeed in continental SSA) Botswana is hardly a priority case 
for debt service relief.
Some Building Blocks
Two and a half existing approaches would, with minor modifications, appear 
to offer ways to meet the debt service reduction needs of Southern Africa 
(and its future trading and investment partners):
1. The Trinidad Terms-Major-Pronk cluster of proposals for low income 
countries;
1.5 The Poland/Egypt agreements which are in fact Trinidad terms applying 
to lower middle income countries and covering commercial as well as 
official debt;
2. The Brady Initiative as applied/negotiated in the cases of Costa Rica 
and Nicaragua which de facto reduced present value of future external 
debt service by from 65% to 75%.
The first cluster treated broadly provides 60% and in special cases 90% 
official debt reduction plus moral suasion on commercial lenders to agree 
to similar cuts (relatively easy with secondary market prices except for 
Zimbabwe and Botswana unlikely to exceed 25% and probably little above 
decorative paper prices for most Mozambican and Tanzanian paper and with 
large provisioning and tax credits already made and taken).
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As such these proposals relate to low income economies (roughly the IDA 
eligible category) and therefore would not apply to Angola (probably), 
Namibia, Zimbabwe or Swaziland (as well as excluding Botswana). This 
appears mildly illogical as the two actual agreements (for official and 
most commercial debt) which appear to be the model for the Trinidad 
proposals are Poland and Egypt, both lower middle income countries.
However, this may be a quibble not requiring pursuit if the Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua, Brady umbrella settlements (providing well over 60% total 
official/commercial debt burden reduction) are viewed as precedents for 
economically small, debt distressed lower middle income countries.
In fact Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia all have special debt characteristics 
which would need to be faced at the case level:
a. Zimbabwe would welcome a reduction in a regional framework, donor/IFI 
backed context so long as it did not prejudice subsequent new 
commercial borrowing. On the Mexican precedent a settlement of write­
down on historic debt service need not do that - but a level of 50% to 
60% effective payment is likely to be needed;
b. Angola may need deferral plus a write-down (however constructed) of 
somewhat less than 60% i_f rapid restoration of peace can be envisaged 
to be paralleled by buoyant real earnings from hydrocarbon exports and 
access to commercial project loans;
c. Namibia's external debt is in fact South African, 'inherited' from an 
administration which was internationally viewed as unlawful and 
constitutionally is not the predecessor to the present state. The 
international community might well view 100% write-off of this debt as 
setting no precedent and, therefore, use moral suasion against South 
Africa (which issued and guaranteed it and whose financial institutions 
hold almost all of the $225 million odd outstanding) to renounce all 
claims on Namibia in respect to it and service it like any other 
domestic South African State obligation.
Trade Arrears Revisited
A very special and problematic case arises in respect to non-financial 
institution unpaid trade arrears (whether by confirmed letter of credit or 
otherwise) which are over 24 to 30 months in arrears i.e. not in any
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meaningful sense in a pipeline. On the one hand their payment in the 
foreseeable future by the three countries (Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique) 
with large amounts outstanding is totally inconceivable. (Indeed in two 
cases at least recent IMF negotiations tacitly accept this by not including 
them in forward projections and targets.) Furthermore, much - probably 
most - of their value has been clawed back by the same firms marking up the 
prices on subsequent cash in advance sales to recoup their lost principle 
and opportunity cost interest and by bad debt write-downs for company tax 
purposes. On the other hand, clearing the books is psychologically 
important to regaining access to normal 90-180 day trade credit and, at 
least as crucial, in eroding the 25% to 50% above normal world prices 
fragmentary studies (including by the World Bank) suggest many SSA 
economies now pay for cash in advance imports.
One practicable solution might be offers based on secondary market value 
(if any!) with an upper limit of 20% and a bottom one of 5%. As the three 
countries principally involved cannot pay and, since they are not paying 
anything now or in the foreseeable future, would not welcome switching of 
present untied aid to this use, the evident way forward would be for a 
consortium of donors (preferably including the main homes of defaulted 
paper) to buy them up. The total outstanding is perhaps $1,500-2,000 
million face or at 5% to 20% $75 to $400 million. If paid by 8 to 10 
countries over 3 to 4 years that would not appear totally unmanageable 
(i.e. $1.75 million to $15 million per financing country per year for the 
region).
... and the IFI'8
IMF, World Bank and African Development Bank drawings - loans - credits 
pose special problems for permanent debt service adjustment to fit capacity 
just as much as they do for deferral.
In the case of the IMF the conversion of all present drawings to SAF/ESAF - 
(and their subsequent rolling over until the country achieved a structural 
external surplus) would arguably reduce the problem to manageable 
proportions. However it could usefully be accompanied by two additional 
steps:
a. making SAF/ESAF 'extra quota' in the specific sense that "Gold
Tranche", "First Credit Tranche" and Compensatory Facility drawings
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would be available on low conditionality as bridging finance to allow 
time to face sudden calamitous shocks irrespective of whether SAF/ESAF 
had been used. Bridging finance not long term development loans are 
the statutory lending purpose of the Fund and permanent exclusion from 
access to such funding for any category of members seems undesirable;
b. reconsidering whether the IMF should be in the long term development 
lending business. SAF/ESAF were created to bail the Fund and 
structurally adjusting drawers out of the disaster that always overhung 
them when large amounts of 7% to 9% 3+3 year credit were outstanding. 
They were not a result of any general belief the Fund should set up a 
new window as a parallel to, or competitor with IDA and the Regional 
Development Banks' analogues to IDA. The answer may very well be no - 
the Fund should not enter into the long term developemnt finance 
business. Specialisation and division of labour have something to be 
said for them. In that case SAF/ESAF should be frozen once conversion 
is complete and new resources channelled via IDA or the African 
Development Fund, not the IMF.
The World Bank and APB have no equally handy solution to parallel SAF/ESAF. 
If their funders agree (to putting up new capital or allocation of profits) 
present or partially retrospective conversion to IDA of old Bank loans to 
newly IDA or mixed eligibility countries could be useful. So - if real 
IDA/ADF resource provision can be raised - would be to push up IDA 
eligibility to say the $750 (1991 prices) GDP per capita. However, the 
basic solutions would appear to need to be along two lines:
a. avoidance of Bank group or ADB net cash collection (interest plus 
repayments in excess of new loans drawn) from Southern African 
countries except with their agreement (e.g. Botswana after the mid 
1980s did not seek new Bank loans until about 1991);
b. bilateral donor cash transfers to reduce the burden of meeting World 
Bank and ADB obligations where these were a significant portion of an 
external debt service burden exceeding the level posited as a ceiling 
by the Guide-lines.
Looking To The Bottom Line
The bottom line is the combined profile of nominal debt service and 
proportion reduction of present value of total future debt service. How 
this is achieved is logically, at most secondary, for lenders and tertiary, 
or less, for borrowers.
In the case of commercial institutions particular home country tax 
provisions could lead to preferences for present principal write-downs 
rather than future interest rate reductions (or visa versa). Similarly 
political preferences could have the same impact on official lenders.
Indeed a few (e.g. Japan) may prefer to convert virtually all future 
transfers to grants and to add a past debt contract servicing allowance to 
basic development transfers rather than reduce principal or interest. 
Whether this appears logical to other creditors or to debtors is rather 
beside the point. So long as the Southern African states secure reduction 
of the service burden on past external debt obligations to levels 
consistent with sustainably high levels of growth, human investment, 
physical infrastructure improvement together with sustainably low levels of 
profit taxation and manageable external balances and so long as creditors 
make roughly equivalent reductions, how the attainment of these goals is 
packaged is of no great importance. To insist that each commercial lender 
or government use the same approach is not only not necessary but probably 
counterproductive.
In Summary
The external debt service burden of most Southern African states was 
unmanageable before the 1991/93 drought debacle. It is even more so now.
While explorations and initial partial moves toward significant debt 
service burden reduction had begun in several cases these were both sketchy 
and far from reaching a permanent sustainable debt service write-down 
outcome. None had reached a point at which speeding up dialogue could 
reach a conclusion in time to cope with the present drought impact scissors 
on external and fiscal accounts.
Therefore a deferral of most or in some cases all non Fund/Bank/ADB 
external debt service for the period 1 July 1992 through 30 June 1993 
deserves immediate attention. In some cases - especially Mozambique,
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Zambia, Tanzania — it might need to be complemented by steps to reduce 
effective burden on the debtor of meeting IMF, World Bank, African 
Development Bank obligations.
The most satisfactory approach to speedy results would probably be a 
regional working conference (major donors/Southern African 10) to set 
Guide-lines followed by use by case agreements within that framework. That 
two stage method could then be applied to reaching a package of more 
permanent external debt service burden reductions based in the Trinidad- 
Major-Pronk proposals, the actual Poland/Egypt agreements and the Brady 
Initiative as applied in the cases of Costa Rica and Nicaragua.
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